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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to discuss the interprétation of the
BP Texas City accident. While bringing a lot of empirical data on a
wide range of dimensions, the US Chemical Safety Board
investigation did not import the normalisation of déviance concept for
sensitising the data. It however clearly indicated a référence to the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board where this concept was
influential (i.e. chapter 8 of the Columbia report, 2003). The aim of
this paper is to see nevertheless how valuable the concept could be for
this case. The Baker Panel report (2007) will be used as a second
source for this purpose. It will also be the opportunity to introduce the
complex debate of the relationship between culture and power. Some,
such as Perrow, hâve indeed criticised the cultural rationale of the
normalisation of déviance, at the expense of power "We miss a great
deal when we substitute culture for power". This paper is not a
judgement of the reports used hère as inputs but rather a way of
interrogating the case with an alternative, and hopefully,
complementary angle.
1 INTRODUCTION
The CSB report on BP Texas City accident (CSB, 2007) provided a deep account of
the organisational genesis of the disaster. Based on a similar framework of the
accident investigation model of CAIB (Columbia Accident Investigation Board),
several dimensions are covered, linking technology, human, organisational and
environmental factors. The historical approach applied by the report allows a
description of the events that shaped the situation prior to the events. Main outcomes
of this investigation are linked with BP organisational way of dealing with proeess
safety, through leaming from expérience (i.e. poor root causes analysis, poor
completion of actions for identifîed deficiencies), management of change (i.e.
budget cuts, organisational changes such a merger and leadership turnover). Other
identifîed items were human factors (i.e. design of control rooms and interfaces,
procédures updates, communication and fatigue issues), safe design and
maintenance of barriers (i.e. blowdown System size, level transmitters failures), but
also relationship with regulators (OSHA and lack of enforcement and inspections
throughout the years).
One of the key finding (at the organisational level) and lengthy development in the
report ("BP Safety culture", p 149 to 174) concerns the way signais about risks were
handled by the management of the plant and by corporate levels. Indeed, following
the accident, as outsiders and readers of the report, messages such as thèse ones
seemed quite clear: there was a risk, according to the HSSE business plan from
March 15 (few days before the accident - 23rd of march) that the refïnery "kills
someone in the 12-18 months". There was also the following message from the
Texas City plant HSSE manager "/ truly believe that we are on the verge of
something bigger happening" (from an email of February 20, 2005).
It is true that the state of the installations and safety management implementation
appear as rather more than inadéquate through the descriptions found in the report.
When reading the findings of the report, one can not help wondering why was the
plant maintained in this apparently degraded level of safety while information was
available and opportunities for action obvious (for instance the replacement of the
blowdown system by a flare system). But at the same time, some similar reports of
investigations of past accidents, such as the presidential commission on the space
shuttle Challenger, were revised by social scientists while introducing principle of
rétrospective fallacy, but also by stressing the associated systemic nature of thèse
types of accidents.
2 INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLES OF ACCIDENTS
2.1 Rétrospective fallacy (and normalisation of déviance)
The rétrospective fallacy advocates that signais présent in the past only appear quite
clear in retrospect1. They are not as clear for the decision-makers at the time of the
events as they are for investigators. "This warning is the warning of the
rétrospective fallacy understanding organisational failure dépends on systematic
research that avoids the rétrospective fallacy by going beyond secondary sources
and summaries, relying instead on personal expertise based on original sources that
reveal ail the complexity, the culture, the culture of the task environment, and the
meaning of actions to insiders at the time." (Vaughan, 1996). Thus, based on this
rétrospective fallacy argument, Vaughan's "normalisation of déviance" (1996)
suggested to revise some of the challenger commission findings. A main principle of
this model is that signais at the time were weak rather than strong, and that décision
to launch was strongly biased by past expérience of engineers regarding joints
behaviour as well as biased by their socialisation. This pattern was created and
maintained by the production of a culture, a culture of production and a structural
secrecy.
The production of a culture occurs with the uncertainties of the technologies.
Engineers introduced the technological uncertainties into qualitative and quantitative
behavioural models, offering the ability to predict or to anticipate. Anomalies or
signais about the gap between the anticipated behaviours and the observations were
closely monitored. Thèse signais triggered the need for new explanations or were
rationalised so that they found their place in the worldview or paradigm developed
by engineers. For Vaughan (1996), thèse signais could either be mixed signais,
routine signais or weak ones. The production of a culture is thus the establishment of
This is also known as the « hindsight bias ».
a prevailing paradigm constraining the way engineers or scientists interpret
phenomena and make sensé of them.
The culture of production refers to the bureaucratie (daily importance of paper and
procédures for dealing with subcontractors, with régulations etc) and political
(imperative of cost and schedules) accountabilities of NASA. Culture of production
was also based on the "can do" culture of NASA, anchored in the past successes of
Apollo program and the ability of the organisation to be successfully meeting its
purposes despite technological challenges.
The structural secrecy introduces the classical problems of organisations such as
spécialisation of functions, géographie distances and difficulty for control functions
to ensure oversights due to problems of independence but also compétence given the
complexity of the technologies involved.
Culture and power. However, this model of normalisation of déviance, introducing
a strong cultural perspective, was not favoured by other social scientists such as
Perrow (1999). Perrow still saw in the Challenger accident an example of sheer
power rather than a cultural manifestation « They were told to take off their
engineering hats and put on their managerial hats and make a managerial and not
engineering décision. To me, that is a case of sheer power, it is not the routinisation
of déviance » (Perrow, 1999). Perrows' sentence introduces the question in social
science of the relationship between culture and power.
It is interesting to notice that culture as a safety issue has been debated quite a lot,
maybe at the expense of power which is however a key dimension in any debates on
organisations, and more widely in any debate on society. Weick (2004) made a point
on this issue, when commenting on Perrow's assertion regarding some
interprétations of his 1984 normal accident book "/ would say that much of the work
in the risk area today is systematically detoxing the power aspects of tny book".
Weick makes the following remark (2004) "So we are ail provoked to remember
that power matters and that it matters differently depending on the plurality of the
powerful organizational interests (p 385) and we are provoked to work out the
mechanism by which this happens, something that has not been done well. We are
also provoked to take a second look at organisational culture. "A focus upon a
culture of reliability is a luxury in the world of risky Systems" (p 360); "We miss a
great deal when we substitute culture for power" (p 380). Perhaps we need another
Snook-like tour de force to show us that culture and power are not opposed
explanations, but rather that culture shapes the way for power, defines power, is
shaped by power, masks power, embodies power. Culture is not just breezy social
constructionist talk (my phrase, not Perrow's), it makes power possible and is made
binding through acts of power". It was not the first time that Perrow illustrated his
point of view on the relationship between power and culture. We find an earlier
sentence from Perrow (1985), in Scott (2000) in which he disapproves "this
infatuation with cultural myths and symbols to the neglect of power and group
interesf. Normalisation of déviance introduces thus the interesting problem of the
relationship between culture and power. It seems that a cultural perspective would
favour normalisation of déviance as an explanatory principle whereas an emphasis
on power would reject the rationale behind it (but this is a simplification).
2.2 Systemic dimension of accidents
The systemic nature of the accident refers to the fact that such events do not happen
in isolated organisations but in wider contexts including outside actors and forces.
The open System perspective introduced is a powerful analogy for organisational
studies (Scott, 2003). Thèse actors and forces can be professions (i.e. engineering
profession), nation states (i.e. régulation and control authorities) or also industries
and associations (i.e. petrochemical industry). Thèse external forces due to the open
property of organisations permit for normalisation of déviance to occur and to be
maintained, so the rétrospective fallacy and the systemic nature of thèse accidents
are closely linked as principles for interpreting accidents.
According to Vaughan (1996), some of thèse outside influences were missed in the
Challenger commission report. The part played by the Congress in constraining the
space agency was not identified whereas NASA depended on congress and had little
freedom. The influence of the engineering culture, which can be considered as a
societal influence through profession, was also not mentioned in the report however
contributed to the normalisation of déviance pattern. "Engineering as a craft and as
a bureaucratie profession contributed to the work group's normalization of
technical déviation in officiai launch décision making venues by providing basic
assumptions that were elaborated in the NASA organisation culture" (Vaughan,
2002, 18).
Following the Columbia shuttle destruction and given the similarity of this accident
with her analysis of Challenger, Vaughan insisted on thèse types of external forces
constraining the possibility of avoiding répétitive négative pattern (Vaughan, 2005,
56). "Cultures of production, whether production of police statistics, war, profits or
timely shuttle launches, are a product of larger historical, cultural, political,
ideological and économie institutions. Making organisational changes that
contradict them is difficult to implement, but in the face of continuing and consistent
institutional forces even more difficult as time passes. Attributing repeating négative
patterns to declining attention and forgetting of lessons learned as a crisis recèdes
into history neglects the sustaining power of thèse institutionalised external forces.
The extent to which an organisation can resist to this condition is likely to vary as its
status and power vary". She found empirical and theoretical support in new
institutionalism for such a position (Powell & Dimaggio, 1991, Scott, 2001). For
Scott, "/ see the ascendance of institutional theory as simply a continuation and
extension of the intellectual révolution begun during the mid 1960s, which
introduced open Systems conceptions into the study of organisations (...)
Organisations were seen as more than production Systems; there were social and
cultural Systems" (Scott, 2001). Institutions constrain (but also enable, in a dual
relationship) organisations in différent manners with différent mechanisms that Scott
distinguishes between regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive. New
institutionalism, by opposition to the old institutionalism (Di Maggio & Powell,
1991a), introduces the latter one, the culture-cognitive forces existing within spécifie
fields, at macro levels with impact at micro levels, such as professions (i.e.
engineering professions in Vaughan's analysis). This approach is contemporary and
influenced by theoretical developments in social sciences such as Garfïnkel (1967),
Berger and Luckmann, (1967), Bourdieu (1977) or Giddens (1984) introducing and
stressing the cognitive dimensions of the relationship between individuals and
society.
3 IMPORTING THE MODEL IN BP TEXAS CITY
ACCIDENT
What is the situation of the BP Texas City refinery in regards with this type of
model and debate that followed the Challenger investigation report (rétrospective
fallacy, systemic nature of accident)? How can an accident of this scale happen
when "The panel observes, however, that during the course of its review, it saw no
information to suggest that anyone, from BP's board members to its hourly workers
acted in anything other than good faith" (Baker panel, 2007, 15). How does it
complément the CSB report that has not made much référence to this spécifie model
of weak signais and normalisation of déviance? Can we apply thèse to the data and
findings? In the next parts, some éléments from the report will be extracted for this
purpose. They will offer a partial perspective (hence the brackets in the headings
"some éléments of') for each items in the scope of this paper. Eléments showing
how the company is opened to its environment hâve been also favoured, in order to
stress some of the systemic dimensions shaping the accident.
3.1 A normalisation of déviance (some éléments of)?
One approach to answer to this question is to look for information that could fit in
the rationale of normalisation of déviance, and then to look for data to fit the
production of culture, culture of production and structural secrecy model. Do we
find a normalisation of déviance in the BP Texas City accident?
It is indicated that the refinery is "Considered one of the world's most complex
refineries, it includes 29 oil refining units and four chemical units, largest BP's
refineries Worldwide (1800 BP employées, 6000 subcontractors) (Bake panel, 2007,
43). From the reports (especially part 9, "BP Safety culture"), it seems quite clear
that many assessments of the state of the installations were performed throughout
the years preceding the accident. Table 1 contains some extracts of the différent
studies carried out and some comments from the CSB.







"There were serious concerns about the potential for a major site incident
due to the large number of hydrocarbon releases (over 80 in the 2000-2001
period). The study also found that many inspections were overdue and that
known reliability issues including instrumentation, needed to be
addressed."
"The analysis concluded that the budget cuts did not consider the spécifie
maintenance needs of the Texas City refinery" the prevailing culture at the
Texas City refinery was to accept cost réductions without challenge and
not to raise concerns when operational integrity was compromised"
In October 2002, the BP group refining VP sent a communication saying
that the financial condition of refining was much worse than expected,, and
that from a financial perspective, refining was in a "crisis mode" (...)
During this same period, Texas City managers decided not to eliminate
atmospheric blowdown Systems.
"the units and staff are actively managing infrastructure risks but the
current condition of the infrastructure and assets is poor at the texas city
refinery""
The 1000 days goal reflected the continuée focus by site leadership on
Personal safety and cost-cutting rather than on process safety"




The project team, led by BP personal outside the refinery, found that the
refinery contributed only to 10 percent of the Global refining profits while
consuming 18 percent of capital expenditure needed to meet environmental
and safety compliance. The Texas City refinery faced additional challenges
due to its unique complexity and interconnectedness. Management stated
that the refinery was the most complex in the world by a factor of two.
Golden rules (2004)
The golden rules addresscd primarily personal safety issues related to work
activities such as working at heights, lifting opertaions, and entering
confined spaces. Although MOC (management of change) is one of the
élément of the golden rules, process safety was not specifically addressed.
Safety Reality
(November 2004) poor safety level, wake up call for plant supervisors
Telos Survey end of
2004 january 2005
"They had never seen such a history of leadership changes and
reorganisations over such a period that resulted in a lack of organisational
Stability "seeing the brutal facts so clearly was hard to digest, including the
concem around the conflict between production and safety. the évidence
was strong and clear and 1 accept my responsibility for the resuit"
Business Unit leader, the 17"1 of mardi, 2005
2005 Budget cuts
"In late 2004, BP group refining leadership ordered a 25 percent budget
réduction "challenge " for 2005. The Texas city business unit leader asked
for more funds based on the conditions of the Texas city plant, but the
group refining managers did not, at first, agrée to his request".
2005 Key Risks The refinery would likely "kill someone in the 12-18 months"
This part of the CSB report reminds the reader of a pattern. Problems were
identified; signais were strong (in retrospect) about the state of the installations,
especially the warning from some whistle blowers and from the many officiai
reports. Thèse signais could be said strong because they were clearly acknowledged
by management. "Seeing the brutal facts so clearly was hard to digest, including the
concern around the conflict between production and safety. The évidence was strong
and clear and I accept my responsibility for the resuit" (CSB report, 2007, 171).
However, we also know that some were not communicated to higher levels. "Serious
safety failures were not communicated in the compiled reports. For example, the
"2004 R&M segment risks and opportunities" report to the group chief executive
States that there were "real advancements in improving segment wide HSSE
performance in 2004", but failed to mention the three major incidents and three
fatalities in Texas City that year" (CSB report, 2007, 145).
A sign of normalization of déviance in the Challenger case was the fact that
information about potential serious problems (cold température potential impact on
joint behaviour) was not transmitted to higher décision raaking levels. Instead of
revealing a decision-making problem pointing at individual faulty managers, it was
indeed, for Vaughan (1996) a sign that insiders collectively constructed an
inadéquate level of risk. Were risks at Texas City in gênerai therefore also
normalized? Were they identified and treated through spécifie measures, each time
establishing a new norm while stepping outside safe boundaries? Do we hâve the
production of culture; a culture of production and a structural secrecy combining
together to produce and maintain a slippery slope (Vaughan, 2005)?
3.2 The production of a culture (some éléments of)
Behavioural safety as a solution. The behavioural safety approach was also
favoured as an answer to the technological problems " The Texas City site's
response to the "control of work review", which occurred after two major accidents
in spring 2004, focused on ensuring compliance with safety rules. The response
stated that the review findings support "our objective to change our culture to hâve
zéro tolérance for wilful non compliance to our safety policies and procédures. (...)
the Texas city business unit leader announced that he was implementing an
educational initiative and accelerated the use of punishment to create a "culture of
discipline"(CSP report, 2007, 164).
An institutional influence. The inadequacy of the answer to the problem faced by
BP through a focus on behavioural compliance with rules could be the sign of one of
thèse external forces contributing to create isomorphic pattern among companies
such as put forward by new institutionalism (Di Maggio and Powell, 1991b, 70). "
Models may be diffused unintentionally, indirectly through employées transfer or
turnover, or explicitly by organisations such as Consulting firms or industry trade
associations. Even innovation can be accounted for by organisational modelling
(...) organisations tend to model themselves after similar organisations in their field
that they perceive to be more legitimate or successfuF'.
This behavioural and disciplinary approach seems indeed to hâve become a norm in
the industry for dealing with human factors in safety. This is clearly performed at
the expense of other approaches targeting more cognitive and contextual approaches
of work such as promoted by ergonomics or sociology (Le Coze and Dupré, 2008).
We find confirmation of this prevailing way of thinking in BP with comments from
employées regarding accident investigations within BP. "A number of hourly
employées at Texas City and Toledo, for example, expressed the belief that
management is more interested in assigning blâme than identifying the root cause of
an incident" (Baker Panel, 2007, p 201). But while in this particular case the
accident reveals the inadequacy of response through behavioural compliance with
rules to identified safety problems, this can't be seen only as the BP company level
but more widely as an industry level, at a systemic level, influencing BP's practices.
3.3 A culture of production (some éléments of)
A "Making do" culture institutionalized. Do we now find éléments regarding the
présence of a culture of production? It certainly is something that is made explicit in
the two reports. As it is obvious that the degraded state of the installations can be
traced back to the budgets cuts throughout the preceding years of the accidents, the
Baker Panel ask the following questions: Did the refinery plant managers and their
staff fail to see the need to spend more? Did they believe that they were more likely
to be rewarded for meeting aggressive cost-cutting goals ?(...) the panel is unable to
answer to thèse questions". Short of answer to thèse questions, it nevertheless found
some support from Browne, the CEO of BP, who suggest a "make do" mentality as
an explanation for the poor state of the installations. "Browne commented that for a
number of years, BP had a "make do" mentality when times in the refinery business
were tough and there was not much money to go around. Browne also commented
that the otherside of "making do " is the fact that if a business gets used to not
having something, it does not notice Us absence. If the business makes do for a long
time, it begins to become blind of the risks that the business faced because the
business just got used to them" (Baker panel, 2007, 84). As Vaughan analysed in a
her case about production pressures that they "became institutionalised and thus
taken-for-granted aspect of the worldview that ail participant brought to NASA
decision-making venues" (Vaughan, 1996, xiv)". Similarly, BP Texas City culture of
production through "making do" principle became institutionalised and created
forces constraining practices of managers.
Unclear tradeoffs as a contributory factor. The fact that corporate levels created
more pressure on the tradeoffs processes at refinery levels did not help to ensure a
better use of the resources. As indicated in the Baker Panel report "While initiative
has been well intentioned, collectively they hâve overloaded refinery management
and staff. BP's corporate organisation has provided the refineries with little
guidance on how to prioritise thèse many initiatives and the refineries do not receive
additional funding to implement each initiative. " (Baker Panel, 2007, p 86).
3.4 Structural secrecy (some éléments of)
A gulf between actual performances and perception of it. BP is a huge company
that "opérâtes in more than 100 countries across six continents and employs more
than 96000 people. BP's corporate structure has been complex for many years"
(Baker Panel, 2007, p27). The size and complexity of BP's organisations
participated in creating a deep gap between many of the objectives of the refineries
and the current practices. "The information available to the panel indicates that a
substantial gulf appears to hâve existed between the actual performance of BP's
process safety management system and BP's perception of that performance. The
gulf did not occur at any one particular point in time and did not exist only at
particular point within the organisation. Instead, the information available to the
Panel appears to indicate a more systemic breakdown occurring at multiple levels
and in différent line and functional positions." (Baker panel, 2007, 228).
The Baker Panel report indeed dedicates two parts on corporate and board
oversights. For the Panel "BP typically did not receive short term négative feedback
on its reorganisations or job réductions, and as a resuit, BP apparently believed that
the refinery opérations continued to hâve the necessary capabilities in place" (Baker
panel, 2007, 81). This is clearly the symptom of effect from structural secrecy,
where relevant information to steer the organisation is not provided.
Turnover in the industry as an institutional influence. An aggravating factor of
structural secrecy at the refinery came from the fréquent changes of leadership. "The
panel believes that the high turnover at the plant manager position has contributed
to the process safety culture leadership weaknesses at those refineries. (...) Texas
City interviewées also noted the differing personalities and priorities of the plant
managers. (Baker Panel, 2007, 73). But turnover in managerial position is a current
practice in the industry. It is not spécifie to BP and could be traced back to an
évolution of practices in the whole industry, a standard that has been pointed at and
criticised after the BP Texas City accident for its impact on safety. « Jeroen van der
Veer, Shell's chief executive, has imposed a job-tenure rule of four to six years for
ail but the most junior staff. Last week BP followed the Dutch company, signalling
that the here-today, gone-tomorrow culture of the globe-hopping oil executive had
to corne to an end.(...) Shell now expects mid-career and senior executives to spend
four to six years in a post, but when Mr van der Veer joined the company in 1971,
rapid job movement was the rule. In a récent interview with The Times, he said that
the industry had changea over the past two décades and needed much greater
professionalism." (The Times, May 7, 2007)2.
4 CONCLUSION
4.1 Preventing « data that should fit model »
Historical events such as industrial accidents are unique, they never repeat in the
exact same ways. They happen at différent time, within différent technologies, with
différent people, etc. But it is also possible to think nevertheless that patterns repeat
themselves. As Hughes wrote "History does not repeat itself in détail, but drawing
analogies between past and présent allow us to see similarities" (Hughes, 2004, p
2). The two positions are défendable. There will indeed probably be always enough
similarities and différences between historical cases to maintain one or the other
position. One important principle for accident investigation, and for both thèse
positions, is to be sensitive to the "data that should fit the modeF symptom (Le
Coze, 2008). This principle warns observers not to attempt to force data to fit pre-
existing models. Enough sensitivity should be therefore granted. It is clear that this
applies to this paper and this interprétative exercise. There is always a risk to use a
case from which the data hâve been collected without in mind the spécifie model
one is trying to apply.
4.2 Strong signal or sheer power ?
Yet, treating the Texas City accident with the normalisation of déviance concept is
also a useful exercise for the question raised between strong/weak signais and
power, between culture and power. We found useful complementary data to the CSB
report in the Baker Panel report (pressures from corporate levels to make tradeoffs
without guidance, "making do" principle etc) to perform a very partial analogy. It is
also an analogy at a macro level, considering risks from the plant perspective and
not from a spécifie technology. It is not completely convincing though, given the
limits pointed at through the "data that should fit the modeF issue and because of
the limited nature of the exercise. There is a bit of a twist in doing so especially
when not working on primary sources (direct interviews and observations) but
indirect ones (reports already organising their findings).
We could nevertheless say that it is interesting to try to look through the event with
the production of a culture, a culture of production and structural secrecy in mind.
But we could also see that this company was under abnormal and extrême
production pressures. With this stated, is a focus upon a culture of reliability (with
ail the conceptual refinements of normalisation of déviance) as Perrow suggested
then a luxury? Does this accident not explain itself simply by targeting misused
power by élites, the power of few to enforce production pressures way out of known
good practices? Is it the power of few, regardless of potential conséquences
(conséquences of which they are not themselves exposed)? The power of high level
The two examples of institutional forces, behavioural approaches and high turnover of managers, are
clearly detrimental to safety. They do not appear in retrospect to be very rational responses to process
safety issues. But they are nevertheless implemented.
officiais taking way too many risk, gambling, while managing complex and highly
hazardous plants? We won't be able to definitely answer this question hère but we
also understand that personal opinion on human nature and society strongly
influences the type of interprétation one would favour.
A sort middle position could be satisfying hère. It is indeed rather difficult to
analytically distinguish culture from power. Wouldn't it be indeed a réduction of the
ase to summarise it as a resuit of power when it is an entire System which revealed
its weaknesses? Accidents of this scale are complex events, with psycho, cognitive,
social, economical, cultural and political dimensions (Le Coze, 2008). As Weick put
it " culture and power are not opposed explanations, but rather than culture shapes
the way for power, defines power, is shaped by power, masks power, embodies
power". Resilience engineering as an applied field, would probably gain in trying to
incorporate into its models the constant intertwined présence of power and culture as
shapers of organisational behaviour.
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